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Abstract. This paper focuses on a new model to reach the existence of equilibrium in a pure exchange economy with fuzzy pref-
erences (PXE-FP). The proposed model integrates exchange, consumption and the agent’s fuzzy preference in the consumption
set. We set up a new fuzzy binary relation on the consumption set to evaluate the fuzzy preferences. Also, we prove that there
exists a continuous fuzzy order-preserving function in the consumption set under certain conditions. The existence of a fuzzy
competitive equilibrium for the PXE-FP is confirmed through a new result on the existence of fuzzy Nash equilibrium for fuzzy
non-cooperative games. The payoffs of all strategy profiles for any agent are fuzzy numbers in fuzzy non-cooperative games.
Finally, we show that the fuzzy competitive equilibrium could be characterized as a solution to an associated quasi-variational
inequality, giving rise to an equilibrium solution.
Keywords: Pure exchange economy, Fuzzy preference, Fuzzy utility function, Fuzzy competitive equilibrium, Quasi-variational
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1. Introduction
The theory of competitive equilibriumwas set up by
Walras [16]. He established a system of simultaneous
equations that described an economy, and also derived
the solutions to this system at equilibrium prices and
quantities of commodities. However, the first rigor-
ous result on the existence of equilibrium was reached
by Wald [1]. With advances in linear programming,
nonlinear analysis and game theory, some discoveries
about the existence of equilibrium were made by other
researchers, like Mckenzie [17], Hildenbrand [28], Be-
wley [27], Liu [13] and so on. In particular, Arrow and
Debreu [14] considered the application of fixed point
theory to equilibrium problems, generalizing Nash’s
theorem on the existence of equilibriumpoints for non-
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cooperative games [11], and then built the existence of
an equilibrium in an abstract economywhich is a varia-
tion on the notion of a non-cooperative game. Further-
more, an alternative approach to the study of equilib-
rium was given using a suitable equivalent variational
inequality, such as that in Donato et al. [20,22], Anello
et al. [6,7], Joré et al. [2] and Milasi [21].
A pure exchange economy is one without produc-
tion. Each agent starts with an initial commodity bun-
dle for trading, and has a definite order of preference
on the set of all commodity bundles. Moreover, each
agent’s order of preference is described by a real utility
function, which he acts to maximize, assuming that the
prices paid and received are independent of his own
choices. The concept of competitive equilibrium, as in-
troduced by Aumann [24], is a state of the market abid-
ing by “the law of supply and demand”, consisting of a
price structure where the total supply of each good ex-
actly balances the total demand and an allocation that
results from trading at these prices.
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It is worth noting that preference can be imagined
as an individual’s attitude toward a set of consump-
tion vectors in the economy, especially as an explicit
decision-making process. That is, the agent’s satisfac-
tion degree of one consumption vector relative to an-
other (satisfaction degree of consumption vector for
short) is either 0 or 1. According to the conclusion in
Debreu [5], there exists a real utility a of any consump-
tion vector for an agent, assuring that he has a clear-cut
attitude. However, an agent’s attitude is not necessarily
clear or coherent when facing a variety of alternative
consumption vectors. For this case, Blin [12] showed
that the agent’s satisfaction degree of any consumption
vector belongs to the closed interval [0, 1]. In such a
situation, the above real utility is no longer reasonable.
As a result, any agent i’s utility of any consumption
vector can be expressed in the form of closed inter-
val, i.e., i’s utility of any consumption vector which is
given by a lower bound a and an upper bound a. In
other words, the satisfaction degree of any consump-
tion vector for any agent is a constant in the closed in-
terval [0, 1] for any utility from a to a.
This research problem can be viewed from two as-
pects. The first aspect is vagueness in the agent’s pref-
erence, which reflects the agent’s indefinite satisfac-
tion degree to many alternative consumption vectors
in economics. In a case where the agent i’s utility of
any consumption vector is given by lower and upper
bounds, it is natural to suppose that i’s utility value
falls into [a, a] following from an increasing satisfac-
tion degree of the consumption vector. Hence, any
agent’s utility of any consumption vector becomes a
fuzzy number a˜. This immediately leads us to a chal-
lenging problem of determining the agent’s preference
if his utility for any consumption vector is a fuzzy
number. Actually, under the above assumption about
an agent’s satisfaction degree of any consumption vec-
tor, the satisfaction degree is not a constant value in
[0, 1] but varies continuously in [0, 1]. For the case
where the agent’s satisfaction degree of consumption
vector monotonically increases with respect to his util-
ity from lower bound to upper bound, we propose a
fuzzy preference of an agent for any two consumption
vectors in evaluating the degrees of relative satisfac-
tion. Thus, we mainly study some relevant issues de-
rived from fuzzy preferences in our paper. The second
aspect is the difficulty of determining market prices
and the redistribution of goods after trading in a pure
exchange economy with fuzzy preferences (PXE-FP).
Primarily, we put forward the PXE-FP model, where
an agent has an initial commodity bundle for trading
and a fuzzy preference on the set of all commodity
bundles. On the basis of this model, there are three key
problems: It is difficult to evaluate the utility of dif-
ferent consumption vectors to agents while taking ac-
count of the fuzzy preference; it is difficult to deter-
mine whether a fuzzy competitive equilibrium exists;
and it is difficult to provide a solution to compute the
market equilibrium. In fact, traditional methods such
as the fixed point theorem cannot provide a solution to
compute the market equilibrium.Moreover, the market
prices and the redistribution of goods for the PXE-FP
reached by “the law of supply and demand”, constitute
the fuzzy competitive equilibrium.
Consequently, the main problem an agent confronts
in a PXE-FP is choosing one or more consumption
vectors from his budget set. The budget set is the set
of admissible commodity vectors that an agent can af-
ford at prices with the value of his initial endowment.
Thus, a selection criterion is necessary for the agent.
One approach to formalize the criterion is to suppose
that the agent has a fuzzy utility index, that is, to define
a fuzzy-valued function on the set of consumption vec-
tors. It is assumed that the agent would fuzzily prefer
one consumption vector to another if his fuzzy utility
of one is greater than that of the other, and would be
fuzzily indifferent if the fuzzy utilities of the two vec-
tors are equal. A total order relation of fuzzy numbers
is needed to compare the fuzzy utilities of different
consumption vectors by which to address the agent’s
problem by finding all the consumption vectors that
maximize the fuzzy utility on his budget set.
In this paper, we provide solutions to the three prob-
lems when considering fuzzy preferences. Firstly, as
mentioned earlier, it is essential to demonstrate that the
agent’s fuzzy preference or indifference is represented
by a fuzzy utility function that maps the consumption
set onto the set of fuzzy numbers. In order to prove
the conclusion, a fuzzy binary relation for any two el-
ements in a reference set (usually a consumption set in
economics) is formulated to evaluate the fuzzy prefer-
ence or indifference for those. The set of fuzzy indif-
ference classes in a reference set is defined as a quo-
tient set. Eventually, the preceding conclusion, which
enables each agent to choose a consumption vector
based on the value of his fuzzy utility, is drawn from
the existence of a fuzzy order-preserving function con-
structed by induction on the rank of the elements of the
quotient set. A total order relation defined by Zhang et
al. [29] using the expected values which are the centers
of the expected values of interval random sets gener-
ated by these fuzzy numbers plays an important role in
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searching for the best consumption vector, i.e., finding
out the maximal fuzzy utility.
Secondly, after developing a link between the agent’s
fuzzy preference or indifference and the fuzzy utility
function, we aim to establish the existence of a fuzzy
competitive equilibrium that provides market prices
and redistribution of goods for the PXE-FP. Only based
on the total order relation of fuzzy numbers and the ex-
pected mapping of the fuzzy utility function, the Kaku-
tani’s theorem [25] can apply to prove the existence
of a fuzzy Nash equilibrium for fuzzy non-cooperative
games, in which the payoffs of all strategy profiles for
any agent are fuzzy numbers. Consequently, we gen-
eralize the fuzzy Nash equilibrium and then prove that
the fuzzy competitive equilibrium exists under some
assumptions.
Thirdly, the variational inequality theory formulates
an alternative approach to explicate the economic equi-
librium, whose significance lies in the analysis of the
properties for the equilibrium price and allocation.
However, the fuzzy preference adds to the difficulty
of maximizing the fuzzy utility function. Here the ex-
pected utility function can be defined according to the
expected value of the fuzzy utility for every consump-
tion vector. Finally, by maximizing the expected util-
ity of each agent, we can characterize the fuzzy com-
petitive equilibrium as the solution to a related quasi-
variational inequality, which results in the alternative
existence of the fuzzy competitive equilibrium. As an
application, an example of the PXE-FP with two goods
and two agents is provided.
The motivation of this work is to establish a new
fuzzy preference that is more accordant with the
agent’s vague attitude. Our goal is to apply the fuzzy
preference to the pure exchange economy, i.e., con-
sider the model of PXE-FP and then confirm the exis-
tence of the fuzzy competitive equilibrium of the PXE-
FP. Unfortunately, neither the uniqueness nor the sta-
bility of the fuzzy competitive equilibrium is investi-
gated in this paper. The latter research would take into
account the dynamic model of PXE-FP. It is the task
of the dynamic model to show the determination of
the equilibrium values of given variables under postu-
lated conditions with various data being specified. In
a real system, the discrete-time system often appears
when only discrete data are available for use. Many
discoveries about the discrete-time system were made
by some researchers, see for exampleDassios [9], Das-
sios and Kalogeropoulos[10], Oliva et al. [8], Abra-
ham and Kulkarni [23] and Moysis and Mishra [19].
Hence, future research will focus on the discrete-time
system with fuzzy dynamic PXE-FP.
At this juncture, the main contribution of this pa-
per is to propose a fuzzy preference and then prove
that there exists a continuous fuzzy order-preserving
function (utility) on the consumption set under certain
conditions based on the total order relation of fuzzy
numbers. The rest of this paper is presented as fol-
lows: In Section 2, we recall some basic concepts of
fuzzy numbers and fuzzy mapping. Section 3 proposes
the fuzzy preference relation and illustrates the link
between the fuzzy preference relation and the fuzzy
order-preserving function. The PXE-FP is introduced
and the existence of a fuzzy competitive equilibrium is
proved in Section 4. The last section concludes with a
brief summary.
2. Preliminaries
This introduction to the theory of fuzzy sets [18,3,
26] is intended to show how to define the PXE-FP.
2.1. Fuzzy numbers
Denote the set of all real numbers by R. A fuzzy set
is a mapping A˜ : R → [0, 1] where A˜(x) assigns to
each point in R a grade of membership. A fuzzy num-
ber we treat in this paper is a fuzzy set which is up-
per semi-continuous, convex, normal and has bounded
support. In other words, a fuzzy number is a mapping
A˜ : R→ [0, 1] with the following properties:
(i) A˜ is upper semi-continuous;
(ii) A˜ is convex, i.e.,
A˜(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ min{A˜(x), A˜(y)}
for all x, y ∈ R, λ ∈ [0, 1];
(iii) A˜ is normal, i.e., ∃ x0 ∈ R for which A˜(x0) = 1;
and
(iv) suppA˜ = {x ∈ R | A˜(x) > 0} is a support of A˜
and its closure cl(supp A˜) is compact,
Let F(R) be the set of all fuzzy numbers in R.
For any A˜ ∈ F(R), there exist a, b, c, d ∈ R,
L : [a, b] → [0, 1] non-decreasing and R : [c, d] →
[0, 1] non-increasing such that the membership func-
tion A˜(x) is given as follows:
A˜(x) =


L(x), if a ≤ x < b,
1, if b ≤ x ≤ c,
R(x), if c < x ≤ d,
0, otherwise.
4 X. Zhang et al. / Existence of an equilibrium for pure exchange economy with fuzzy preferences
A fuzzy number denoted by ⌊a, b, c, d⌋ is trapezoidal
if the functions L and R are linear.
The α-level set of a fuzzy number A˜ ∈ F(R), 0 ≤
α ≤ 1, denoted by A˜[α], is defined as
A˜[α] =
{
{x ∈ R|A˜(x) ≥ α}, if 0 < α ≤ 1,
cl(supp A˜), if α = 0.
It is clear that the α-level set of a fuzzy number is a
closed bounded interval [A∗(α), A
∗(α)], whereA∗(α)
and A∗(α) denote the left-hand and right-hand end-
point of A˜[α], respectively. Let A˜, B˜ be two fuzzy
numbers and λ a real number. The fuzzy addition A˜+˜B˜
and scalar multiplication λB˜ are fuzzy numbers that
have the membership functions (A˜+˜B˜)(z) and λA˜(z),
defined as follows: for any z ∈ R,
(A˜+˜B˜)(z) = sup
y∈R
{min(A˜(y), B˜(z − y))},
(λA˜)(z) =
{
A˜( z
λ
), if λ 6= 0,
0, if λ = 0.
Moreover, the α-level sets of the fuzzy addition and
the scalar multiplication have the following properties:
(A˜+˜B˜)[α] = [A∗(α) +B∗(α), A
∗(α) +B∗(α)],
(λA˜)[α] = [λA∗(α), λA
∗(α)], if λ > 0,
(λA˜)[α] = [λA∗(α), λA∗(α)], if λ < 0,
(A˜+˜λ)[α] = (A˜+˜λ˜)[α] = [A∗(α) + λ,A
∗(α) + λ].
The expected value E(A˜) of a fuzzy number A˜ is
defined as follows:
E(A˜) = 12
∫ 1
0
(A∗(α) +A
∗(α))dα.
For any A˜, B˜ ∈ F(R), the expected values of fuzzy
numbers satisfy the following properties:
E(A˜+˜B˜) = E(A˜)+E(B˜), E(A˜−˜B˜) = E(A˜)−E(B˜).
Using the expected values, a total order relation of
fuzzy numbers was introduced by [29], that is, for any
A˜, B˜ ∈ F(R), we say A˜ is weakly superior to B˜, de-
noted by A˜ < B˜, if and only if E(A˜) ≥ E(B˜); A˜ and
B˜ are an indifference relationship, denoted by A˜ ≈ B˜,
if and only if E(A˜) = E(B˜); A˜ is superior to B˜, de-
noted by A˜ ≻ B˜, if and only if E(A˜) > E(B˜).
From the definition of the total order relation of
fuzzy numbers, it is easy to show that for any subset
X˜ of the set of all fuzzy numbers, i.e., X˜ ⊆ F(R), the
maximum value and supremum of the set X˜ are defined
as:
C˜ ≈ max
A˜∈X˜
A˜⇔ E(C˜) = max
A˜∈X˜
E(A˜),
C˜ ≈ sup
A˜∈X˜
A˜⇔ E(C˜) = sup
A˜∈X˜
E(A˜),
The minimum value and infimum of the set X˜ are de-
fined in the same way.
2.2. Fuzzy mapping
In what follows, for any x ∈ Rl and δ > 0, let
Bδ(x) = {y ∈ R
l | ‖y − x‖ < δ}. Then, in succes-
sion, we give some related concepts of fuzzy mapping.
Definition 1. Let X be the non-empty subset of Rl.
A fuzzy mapping f˜ : X → F(R) is said to be:
(i) upper semicontinuous at x0 ∈ X if for any ε˜ =
ε > 0 there exists a δ = δ(x0, ε) > 0 such that
f˜(x) 4 f˜(x0)+˜ε˜ (1)
for all x ∈ X ∩ Bδ(x0), and f˜ : X → F(R) is
upper semicontinuous if it is upper semicontinu-
ous at any point ofX ;
(ii) lower semicontinuous at x0 ∈ X if for each ε˜ =
ε > 0 there exists a δ = δ(x0, ε) > 0 such that
f˜(x0) 4 f˜(x)+˜ε˜ (2)
for all x ∈ X ∩ Bδ(x0), and f˜ : X → F(R) is
lower semicontinuous if it is lower semicontinu-
ous at each point ofX ; and
(iii) continuous at x0 ∈ X if it is upper semicontinu-
ous and lower semicontinuous at x0 ∈ X .
Let f˜ : X → F(R) be a fuzzy mapping parameter-
ized by
f˜(x) = {(f(x)∗(α), f(x)
∗(α), α) : α ∈ [0, 1]},
X. Zhang et al. / Existence of an equilibrium for pure exchange economy with fuzzy preferences 5
for each x ∈ X .
The expected mapping fE(x) for any x ∈ X de-
fined as
fE(x) =
1
2
∫ 1
0
[f(x)∗(α) + f(x)
∗(α)]dα,
is a real-valued function. Consequently, (1) and (2) can
be written as
fE(x) ≤ fE(x0) + ε
and
fE(x0) ≤ fE(x) + ε.
Following from the expected mapping, we can get the
following result which describes a continuous fuzzy
function as a continuous real function.
Theorem 1. Let f˜ : X → F(R) be a fuzzy mapping
parameterized by
f˜(x) = {(f(x)∗(α), f(x)
∗(α), α) : α ∈ [0, 1]},
for each x ∈ X . The fuzzy mapping f˜ is continuous at
x0 ∈ X if and only if its expected mapping is continu-
ous at x0.
Definition 2. LetX be a non-empty convex subset of
Rl. f˜ : X → F(R) is said to be fuzzy quasi-concave
if for any x,y ∈ X ,
fE(λx+ (1− λ)y) ≥ min{fE(x), fE(y)}, (3)
for each λ ∈ (0, 1), where fE(x) is the expected
mapping of f˜(x). Moreover, f˜ is said to be strictly
fuzzy quasi-concave if inequality (3) strictly holds for
fE(x) 6= fE(y).
3. Fuzzy preference relation and fuzzy
order-preserving function
Generally, preference is strongly linked to an indi-
vidual’s explicit attitude toward a collection of objects
that can influence his decision making. For instance,
preference implies the agent’s satisfaction degree of
any consumption vector, which is either 0 or 1 in the
economy. Moreover, there is a real utility of any con-
sumption vector for an agent verified by Debreu [5].
In fact, an agent’s attitude is ambiguous when facing
a variety of alternative consumption vectors. In other
words, his choice from the consumption set is not nor-
mally in line with his preference ≻i, i.e., the binary
relation (0 or 1) with respect to any two consumption
vectors is not an adequate explanation for his attitude.
A different binary relation was introduced by Naka-
mura [15].
Let X be a reference set. A binary relation R of
X , defined by Nakamura [15], is characterized by a
membership function:
µR : X ×X → [0, 1].
Under this circumstance, an agent’s utility of any
consumption vector can be given by a lower bound
and an upper bound, which means the satisfaction de-
gree of any consumption vector for an agent is a con-
stant in [0, 1] for any utility from lower bound to up-
per bound. However, naturally assume that the agent’s
satisfaction degree of any consumption vector mono-
tonically increases with regard to his utility from lower
bound to upper bound. Consequently, the agent’s satis-
faction degree of any consumption vector is not a con-
stant value in [0, 1] but varies continuously in [0, 1].
Therefore, it is necessary to define the following fuzzy
binary relation G of a reference setX (usually in the fi-
nite vector space of commodity bundles in economics).
Definition 3. Let X be a reference set. A fuzzy bi-
nary relation G ofX is characterized by a membership
function
µG : X ×X → F(R).
Based on the fuzzy binary relation G, we define a
fuzzy preference relation %G on a reference set X .
Definition 4. For any x, y ∈ X , if µG(x, y) <
µG(y, x), we say x is fuzzily weakly preferred to y,
denoted by x %G y; if µG(x, y) ≈ µG(y, x), x is
fuzzily indifferent to y, denoted by x ∼G y; x is fuzzily
preferred to y, denoted by x ≻G y, if µG(x, y) ≻
µG(y, x).
Observe that the fuzzy preference relation %G is
deemed to be “consistent” if µG(x, y) < µG(y, x) and
µG(y, z) < µG(z, y) imply that µG(x, z) < µG(z, x).
We assume the fuzzy preference relation %G is
“consistent” in this paper. Owing to the total order re-
lation of fuzzy numbers defined by Zhang et al. [29],
the fuzzy preference relation %G of a reference set X
satisfies the following properties:
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(1) For any x ∈ X , x %G x;
(2) For any x, y, z ∈ X , x %G y, and y %G z, it yields
that x %G z;
(3) For any x, y ∈ X , x %G y and/or y %G x;
(4) For any x, y ∈ X , if x %G y and y %G x, then
x ∼G y.
Meanwhile, we say that the fuzzy preference relation
%G is a completely ordered relation and (X,%G) is a
completely ordered space.
Note that for any x, y, z belonging to a reference
set X , the fuzzy interval [x, y] (or (x, y)) denotes
{z | x -G z -G y} (or {z | x ≺G z ≺G y}); for
any a˜, b˜, c˜ ∈ F(R), the fuzzy number interval [a˜, b˜] (or
(a˜, b˜)) denotes {c˜ | a˜ 4 c˜ 4 b˜} (or {c˜ | a˜ ≺ c˜ ≺ b˜}).
A completely ordered topology is the topology gen-
erated by the fuzzy intervals. A natural topology on a
reference set X is a completely ordered topology for
which the sets {x ∈ X | x -G x
′} and {x ∈ X |
x′ -G x} are closed for all x
′ ∈ X , where the closed
set {x ∈ X | x -G x
′} implies that for any sequence
{x(n)} of points inX with a limit x0 ∈ X , if for all n,
x(n) -G x
′, then x0 -G x
′.
A fuzzy function f˜(x) : X → F(R) defined on a
reference set X is said to be order-preserving if x -G
y is equivalent to f˜(x) 4 f˜(y). The domain of values
of the function f˜ is denoted by f˜(X).
The quotient set X/∼ = {qx | ∀x ∈ X} = Q is the
set of all fuzzy indifference classes in a reference setX
denoted by Q, where qx = {y ∈ X | y ∼G x} is the
collection of all elements fuzzily indifferent to x inX .
For any q ∈ Q, q is a fuzzy indifference class in X .
Lemma 1. Given the fuzzy preference relation%G and
a reference setX , let the quotient setQ ofX be count-
able. There exists a continuous fuzzy order-preserving
function in any natural topology onX .
Proof. Due to the total order relation of fuzzy num-
bers and the expected function of a fuzzy mapping, it
is possible to construct a fuzzy order-preserving func-
tion φ˜ mapping Q into some finite fuzzy number in-
terval by induction on the rank of the element of Q. It
is assumed that there exist two fuzzy numbers a˜ and c˜
such that a˜ ≈ inf
q∈Q
φ˜(q), c˜ ≈ sup
q∈Q
φ˜(q). If b˜′ satisfies
a˜ ≺ b˜′ ≺ c˜ and b˜′ /∈ φ˜(Q), the following four cases
may occur:
(i) the set {b˜ ∈ φ˜(Q) | b˜ ≺ b˜′} may have a largest
element;
(ii) the set {b˜ ∈ φ˜(Q) | b˜ ≺ b˜′} may not have a
largest element;
(iii) the set {b˜ ∈ φ˜(Q) | b˜′ ≺ b˜} may have a smallest
element;
(iv) the set {b˜ ∈ φ˜(Q) | b˜′ ≺ b˜} may not have a
smallest element.
We intend to remove the gaps of types (i-iv), (ii-iii)
and (ii-iv). Let us present a fuzzy non-decreasing step
function ψ˜(b˜) for which the height of each step is equal
to the length of the corresponding gap. Then the new
fuzzy function f˜0(q) = φ˜(q)−˜ψ˜[φ˜(q)] which maps Q
into some finite fuzzy number interval is still order-
preserving and f˜0(Q) has no gaps of the unwanted
types. We define f˜(x) = f˜0(qx). Aiming to show that
f˜ is continuous in any natural topology onX , we have
to consider a fuzzy number b˜′ so that a˜ ≺ b˜′ ≺ c˜ and
the set Xb˜′ = {x ∈ X | f˜(x) 4 b˜
′}.
(a) If b˜′ ∈ f˜(X), let x′ ∈ X be such that b˜′ ≈ f˜(x′),
which means Xb˜′ = {x ∈ X | f˜(x) 4 f˜(x
′)}.
Because f˜ is order-preserving, it implies Xb˜′ =
{x ∈ X | x -G x
′} and thus is a closed set.
(b) Supposing that b˜′ /∈ f˜(X) and the setWb˜′ = {b˜ ∈
f˜(X) | b˜ ≺ b˜′} has a largest element b˜′′, this
meansXb˜′′ = Xb˜′ which is closed by (a).
(c) With the hypotheses that b˜′ /∈ f˜(X) and the set
Wb˜′ has no largest element, it involves the set
W b˜
′
= {b˜ ∈ f˜(X) | b˜′ ≺ b˜} without a smallest el-
ement since f˜(X) has no gap of type (ii-iii). Thus
Xb˜′ =
⋂
b˜∈W b˜′
Xb˜ and Xb˜′ is closed as an intersec-
tion of closed sets.
In the same way, the verdict holds for the set X b˜
′
=
{x ∈ X | b˜′ 4 f˜(x)} of any fuzzy number b˜′. It
follows that the inverse image by f˜ of any closed set is
a closed set onX .
Lemma 2. Given the fuzzy preference relation%G and
a reference set X , let R be a countable subset of X .
For every pair x, y ∈ X meeting x -G y, if there is
an element r of R such that x -G r -G y, then there
exists a continuous fuzzy order-preserving function in
any natural topology onX .
Proof. Let us consider the two quotient setsX/∼ = Q
and R/∼ = D. D is countable. If Q has a smallest
and/or a largest element, without any loss of generality,
we can suppose that both possible elements belong to
D.
Here, we define another equivalence relation among
the elements of Q as: q1Fq2 if and only if there ex-
ists a finite number of elements of Q between q1 and
q2. Also, equivalence classes for F are denoted by
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[q1]F , [q2]F , · · · , [qr]F , · · · . Every equivalence class
is countable. Moreover an equivalence class [q]F with
more than one element of Q contains an element of
D, which implies that the equivalence classes [q]F
form a countable set. We denote the union over these
classes [q]F by D
′ which is countable and then define
T = D ∪D′.
As in the proof of Lemma 1, we construct the func-
tion f˜0 on T and extend it from T to Q as follows.
Let q ∈ Q and q /∈ T . It is found that the set
Tq = {t ∈ T | t ≺G q} has no largest element. In
fact, for any t′ ∈ Tq , q /∈ T so that q /∈ D
′. Be-
sides, there is an infinity of elements of Q between
t′ and q, and then there exists an infinity of elements
of T between t′ and q. Similarly the set T q = {t ∈
T | q ≺G t} has no smallest element. That means
the value sup
t∈Tq
f˜0(t) equals to inf
t∈T q
f˜0(t), since f˜0(T )
has no gap of type (ii-iv). This equal value defines
f˜0(q), which is clearly order-preserving, and therefore
the fuzzy function f˜(x) = f˜0(qx) is order-preserving.
Furthermore, analogous to the proof of Lemma 1, we
can conclude that f˜(x) is continuous in any natural
topology on X , since f˜(X) = f˜0(Q) has no gap of
type (i-iv) or (ii-iii).
A completely ordered topological space (X,%G) is
perfectly separable if there exists a countable class for
any open set in (X,%G) such that the open set is the
union of the sets of the class.
Theorem 2. Given the fuzzy preference relation %G
and a reference set X , let (X,%G) be a perfectly sep-
arable space. If for every x′ ∈ X , the sets {x ∈ X |
x -G x
′} and {x ∈ X | x′ -G x} are closed, there
exists a continuous fuzzy order-preserving function on
X .
Proof.We can choose an element in any non-empty set
S of X . In this way, these elements form a countable
set R′′. Let us consider the pair q1, q2 ∈ Q = X/∼
satisfying the conditions that q1 ≺G q2 and there does
not exist a fuzzy indifference class q3 ∈ Q such that
q1 ≺G q3 ≺G q2. Assert that the set of those pairs is
countable. To prove this, we take two elements x′, y′ in
the indifference classes q1 and q2 respectively. More-
over, the set {x ∈ X | x ≺G y
′} is open and hence
there exists a set Sq2 in the class of S such that x
′ ∈
Sq2 ⊆ {x ∈ X | x ≺G y
′}. Provided that q′1, q
′
2 is an-
other pair possessing the same properties, Sq′2 is differ-
ent from Sq2 . If q1 ≺G q2 -G q
′
1 ≺G q
′
2, then x
′′ ∈ Sq′2
and x′′ /∈ Sq2 . Else if q
′
1 ≺G q
′
2 -G q1 ≺G q2, then
x′ ∈ Sq2 and x
′ /∈ Sq′2 . It is obvious that the pair q1, q2
is in one-to-one correspondence with a subclass of the
countable class of S. Then choose an element x′ in
each class q1 and an element y
′ in each class q2. All
those x′ and y′ form a countable set namedR′.
Let us examine the countable set R = R′ ∪ R′′. It
satisfies all the properties required by Lemma 2. Let
x, y be a pair of elements of X such that x ≺G y. If
the set (x, y) is non-empty, it contains a non-empty set
S and therefore an element of R′′. Otherwise, x ∼G
x′ ∈ R′ and y ∼G y
′ ∈ R′. In any case, [x, y] contains
an element ofR.
Finally, for a given fuzzy preference relation %G ,
a fuzzy utility function is an order-preserving function
u˜(x) that maps reference setX into the set of all fuzzy
numbers. Observe that, under the condition that for
every x′ ∈ X the sets {x ∈ X | x -G x
′} and
{x ∈ X | x′ -G x} are closed, the fuzzy utility func-
tion u˜(x) onX is continuous.
4. The existence of a fuzzy competitive
equilibrium
In our paper, for any vectors xi,yi ∈ R
l, xi > yi
means xih > yih for all h; xi ≧ yi means xih ≥ yih
for all h; and xi > yi means xi ≧ yi but not xi = yi.
The scalar product
l∑
h=1
xihyih of two members xi and
yi of R
l is denoted by 〈xi,yi〉.
4.1. PXE-FP model
In the classical pure exchange economy, we take
into account a marketplace consisting of l different
goods indexed by h = 1, · · · , l and m agents de-
noted by i = 1, · · · ,m. Every agent i has an ini-
tial endowment vector: wi = (wi1, · · · , wil) ∈ R
l
+.
The consumption vector relative to the agent i is xi =
(xi1, · · · , xil) ∈ Xi ⊆ R
l
+, where xih is consumption
relative to the commodity h, Xi is interpreted as the
consumption set of agent i, and x = (x1, · · · ,xm) ∈
m∏
i=1
Xi represents the consumption of the market. We
denote the price vector by p = (p1, · · · , pl) ∈ R
l
+,
where ph(h = 1, · · · , l) is the price of commodity h.
As is standard in economic theory, the choice by the
agent from a given set of alternative consumption vec-
tors is assumed to be made in accordancewith his pref-
erence≻i. The reason is that there exists a utility func-
tion: ui : R
l
+ → R such that ui(xi) ≥ ui(x
′
i) if and
only if xi is preferred or indifferent to x
′
i for agent i.
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Nevertheless, the agent’s attitude is ambiguous
when facing all sorts of alternative consumption vec-
tors, which is analyzed in Section 3. Accordingly, we
define a fuzzy preference relation %G on a reference
set as Definition 4, in order to better propose a new
model which we study in this paper. In this section, an
agent i’s fuzzy preference relation on a consumption
set Xi is denoted by %
i
G .
Definition 5. A PXE-FP is defined as
E˜ = (Rl+, Xi,%
i
G ,wi)
consisting ofm agents indexed by i = 1, · · · ,m, each
of which has a fuzzy preference %iG as well as an ini-
tial endowment vector wi = (wi1, · · · , wil) ∈ R
l
+,
and trades l different goods denoted by h = 1, · · · , l,
whereXi ⊆ R
l
+ is the consumption set of agent i and
its element xi = (xi1, · · · , xil) is a consumption vec-
tor of the agent.
Remark 1. The pure exchange economy is a special
case of the PXE-FP when the agent’s satisfaction de-
gree for any consumption vector is only 0 or 1.
An agent’s motivation in the choice of a consump-
tion vector is to maximize his fuzzy utility among all
consumption vectors that belong to his budget set, ad-
missible consumption vectors of which are affordable
for the agent at price vector p = (p1, · · · , pl) with the
value of his initial endowment vector wi. In turn, the
agent’s income can be regarded as the receipts from
sales of the initial endowments.
Condition (1) x¯i is the optimum solution of
max
xi∈Bi(p¯)
u˜i(xi), where Bi(p¯) = {xi | xi ∈ Xi, 〈p¯,
xi〉 ≤ 〈p¯,wi〉}, for all i = 1, · · · ,m.
It is required that the prices of different goods be
non-negative and not all zero. Without any loss of gen-
erality, we can normalize the vector p¯ by restricting
the sum of its coordinates to be 1.
Condition (2) p¯ ∈ P = {p | p ∈ Rl,p ≧
0,
l∑
h=1
ph = 1}.
The market for any goods is usually considered to
be in equilibrium if the supply of the good equals the
demand for it. However, the price of some good may
be zero, which means supply will exceed demand. The
aggregate excess demand is z = (z1, · · · , zl) ∈ R
l,
where zh =
m∑
i=1
(xih − wih) and xih − wih is the
individual excess demand of agent i relative to good
h = 1, · · · , l.
Condition (3) z¯ ≦ 0, 〈p¯, z¯〉 = 0.
Definition 6. For PXE-FP E˜ , a pair (p¯, x¯) is said to
be a fuzzy competitive equilibrium of E˜ if it satisfies
Conditions (1)-(3).
A fuzzy competitive equilibrium is a state of the
market arriving at by “the law of supply and demand",
which consists of a competitive equilibrium price p¯
and a competitive equilibrium allocation x¯ such that
the fuzzy utility of x¯i for any agent i in his budget set
is maximal.
In what follows, we obtain the existence result of
a fuzzy competitive equilibrium from two perspec-
tives, with the total order relation of fuzzy numbers
and the expected function of a fuzzy mapping as key
points. The first method mainly generalizes the exis-
tence of the fuzzy Nash equilibrium confirmed by fixed
point theorem in [11]. Nevertheless, the uniqueness
of the fuzzy competitive equilibrium cannot be illus-
trated by the first method. So then, we take into ac-
count the second approach which applies an associated
quasi-variational inequality. If the solution of the cor-
responding quasi-variational inequality is unique un-
der some specific conditions, then there exists only one
fuzzy competitive equilibrium of the PXE-FP. Further-
more, the fuzzy competitive equilibrium can be char-
acterized by the solution of the quasi-variational in-
equality.
We will obtain the existence of the fuzzy Nash equi-
librium for a fuzzy non-cooperative game before sub-
stantiating the existence of a fuzzy competitive equi-
librium for a PXE-FP.
4.2. Fuzzy non-cooperative games
A classical non-cooperative game consists of n
players indexed by N = {1, · · · , n}. Any player i has
his own set of possible strategies Si and players ex-
cept i have strategy profiles S−i = S1 × · · · × Si−1 ×
Si+1×· · ·×Sn. To play the game, under the condition
that other players choose a strategy profile s−i ∈ S−i,
player i selects a strategy si ∈ Si. s = (si, s−i) ∈ S
denotes the vector of strategies selected by the players
and S =
n∏
i=1
Si is the set of strategy profiles of the
game. The vector of strategies s ∈ S chosen by the
players determines the payoff for each player. Gener-
ally, ui : S → R is used to denote the payoff func-
tion of the i-th player and G = (N,Si, ui) denotes a
classical noncooperative game.
In consideration of the impression of information
in decision-making problems, we define a fuzzy non-
cooperative game by integrating into a fuzzy payoff.
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Definition 7. A fuzzy non-cooperative game is de-
fined as GF = (N,Si, u˜i) consisting of n players in-
dexed by i ∈ N = {1, · · · , n}, each of whom has
a strategy set Si as well as a fuzzy payoff function
u˜i : S → F(R), where S =
n∏
i=1
Si is the set of strat-
egy profiles.
Definition 8. For any fuzzy non-cooperative game
GF = (N,Si, u˜i), (s
⋆
i , s
⋆
−i) is said to be a fuzzy Nash
equilibrium if and only if
u˜i(s
⋆
i , s
⋆
−i) < u˜i(si, s
⋆
−i), for any i ∈ N, si ∈ Si,
where s⋆−i = {s
⋆
1, · · · , s
⋆
i−1, s
⋆
i+1, · · · , s
⋆
n}.
To enhance the players’ choices, we formally de-
fine a randomized strategy so that anyone can pick a
probability distribution over his set of possible strate-
gies, which is called mixed strategy. Players evaluate
the random payoff by the expected fuzzy payoff of
the mixed strategy. Thus, a fuzzy Nash equilibrium of
mixed strategies can be similarly defined by Definition
8.
4.3. Fixed point method
Following from the total order relation of fuzzy
numbers presented by Zhang et al. [29], the continu-
ous fuzzy payoff function and the fixed point theorem,
we put forward the following theorem which refers to
the existence of the fuzzy Nash equilibrium of GF di-
rectly.
Theorem 3. For any fuzzy non-cooperative game
GF = (N,Si, u˜i), if Si is a non-empty, compact as
well as convex set, then there exists a fuzzy Nash equi-
librium of mixed strategies.
We introduce a generalization of a fuzzy non-
cooperative game named fuzzy abstract economy and
define a fuzzy equilibrium of a fuzzy abstract econ-
omy. One lemma generalizing Theorem 3, gives con-
ditions for the existence of a fuzzy equilibrium of a
fuzzy abstract economy.
Let Hk ⊆ R
l, k = 1, · · · , n and H = H1 × H2 ×
· · · × Hn, i.e., H is the set of ordered n-tuple a =
(a1, a2, · · · , an), where ak ∈ Hk for k = 1, · · · , n.
For each k, assume that there is a fuzzy function f˜k
defined overH. LetH−k = H1×H2× · · ·×Hk−1×
Hk+1 × · · · × Hn, i.e., the set of ordered (n − 1)-
tuples a−k = (a1, · · · , ak−1, ak+1, · · · , an), where
ak′ ∈ Hk′ for each k
′ 6= k. Assume ak ∈ Ak(a−k) ⊆
Hk for each point a−k ∈ H−k, i.e., Ak(a−k) is
a set-valued function defined for each point a−k ∈
H−k. Then the sequence [H1, · · · ,Hn, f˜1, · · · , f˜n,
A1(a−1), · · · , An(a−n)] is termed a fuzzy abstract
economy.
Definition 9. For fuzzy abstract economy [H1, · · · ,
Hn, f˜1, · · · , f˜n, A1(a−1), · · · , An(a−n)], a¯ is a fuzzy
equilibrium point of a fuzzy abstract economy and if
for all k = 1, · · · , n, a¯k ∈ Ak(a¯−k), it holds that
f˜k(a¯−k, a¯k) ≈ max
ak∈Ak(a¯−k)
f˜k(a¯−k, ak).
We recall some definitions in Debreu [4]. The graph
of Ak(a−k) is the set {a | ak ∈ Ak(a−k)}. The set-
valued function Ak(a−k) is said to be continuous at
a0−k if for any a
0
k ∈ Ak(a
0
−k) and any sequence {a
(n)
−k}
converging to a0−k , there exists a sequence {a
(n)
k } con-
verging to a0k such that for all n, a
(n)
k ∈ Ak(a
(n)
−k ).
Based on the total order relation of fuzzy numbers
and the expected function of a fuzzy mapping, the fol-
lowing lemma is acquired.
Lemma 3. A fuzzy abstract economy [H1, · · · ,Hn,
f˜1, · · · , f˜n, A1(a−1), · · · , An(a−n)] has a fuzzy equi-
librium point, if
(i) for each k,Hk is compact and convex, f˜k(a−k, ak)
is fuzzy continuous onH and fuzzy quasi-concave
in ak;
(ii) for every a−k, Ak(a−k) is a continuous function
whose graph is a closed set; and
(iii) for every a−k, the set of Ak(a−k) is convex and
non-empty.
What follows are certain assumptions concerning
the consumption units in a PXE-FP. Afterwards, we
can get the existence theorem of a fuzzy competitive
equilibrium for E˜ .
For any good h = 1, · · · , l, the rate of consumption
is necessarily non-negative of the agent i = 1, · · · ,m,
i.e., xih ≥ 0.
Assumption I The set of consumption vectorsXi
available to an individual i = 1, 2, · · · ,m is a closed
convex subset of Rl+, i.e., xi ≧ 0, for all xi ∈ Xi.
Assumption II For all x′i ∈ Xi, the sets {xi ∈
Xi | xi -
i
G x
′
i} and {xi ∈ Xi | x
′
i -
i
G xi} are closed
for all x′i ∈ Xi.
This assumption ensures the continuity of u˜i(xi)
demonstrated by Theorem 2.
Assumption III For anyxi ∈ Xi, there is x
′
i ∈ Xi
such that u˜i(x
′
i) ≻ u˜i(xi).
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This means there is no consumption vector that an
individual would fuzzily prefer to all others.
Assumption IV If u˜i(xi) ≻ u˜i(x
′
i) and 0 < λ <
1, then u˜i[λxi + (1− λ)x
′
i] ≻ u˜i(x
′
i).
This assumption corresponds to the usual assump-
tion that the fuzzy indifference surfaces are convex in
the sense that the set {xi | xi ∈ Xi and u
i
E(xi) ≥ a}
is a convex set for any fixed real number a, where
uiE(xi) is the expected utility function of the fuzzy
utility function u˜i(xi).
We also suppose that agent i possesses an initial en-
dowment vectorwi of different goods available.
Assumption V For some xi ∈ Xi, there exists a
wi ∈ R
l
+ such that xi < wi.
This shows that any agent could exhaust his initial
endowments in some feasible way and still have a pos-
itive amount of each good available for exchange in the
PXE-FP.
Theorem 4. For a PXE-FP E˜ , if E˜ satisfies Assump-
tions I-V, then there is a fuzzy competitive equilibrium
of E˜ .
Proof. (i) For any agent i, it is supposed that x−i de-
notes a point inX1×· · ·×Xi−1×Xi+1×· · ·×Xm×P ,
i.e., x−i has components as xi′(i
′ 6= i), p. Here define
Ai(x−i) = {xi | xi ∈ Xi, 〈p,xi〉 ≤ 〈p,wi〉}.
Then, we consider the fuzzy abstract economy E˜ =
[X1, · · · , Xm, P, u˜1(x1), · · · , u˜m(xm), 〈p, z〉, A1(x−1),
· · · , Am(x−m), P ]. That is, any of m consumption
units chooses a vector xi from Xi, subject to xi ∈
Ai(x−i), and receives u˜i(xi); the (m + 1)-th unit,
i.e., market participant, chooses p from P and obtains
〈p, z〉.
Before establishing the existence of a fuzzy equilib-
rium point for the fuzzy abstract economy E˜, we in-
tend to prove that such a fuzzy equilibrium point is also
a fuzzy competitive equilibrium of PXE-FP according
to E˜ as Definition 6. Obviously, Condition (1) and (2)
follow immediately from the definition of a fuzzy equi-
librium point of E˜.
Evidently, each agent spends his entire income be-
cause of the absence of saturation. To be more precise,
Assumption III shows that there exists at least one con-
sumption vector x′i ∈ Xi such that
u˜i(x
′
i) ≻ u˜i(x¯i),
where x¯i is the equilibrium value of xi. Let λ be an
arbitrarily small positive number. On account of As-
sumption IV,
u˜i[λx
′
i + (1− λ)x¯i] ≻ u˜i(x¯i).
In other words, in every neighbourhood of x¯i, there is
at least one point of Xi fuzzily preferred to x¯i. Due
to Condition (1), 〈p¯, x¯i〉 ≤ 〈p¯,wi〉. Assume the strict
inequality holds. That is, we can choose a point of
Xi for which the inequality still holds and which is
fuzzily preferred to x¯i, a contradiction of Condition
(1). Hence, 〈p¯, x¯i〉 = 〈p¯,wi〉. In order to attain his
equilibrium consumption plan x¯i, agent i must actu-
ally receive the total income given by the initial en-
dowments. Thus, he cannot withhold any initial hold-
ings of any good h from the market if ph > 0. Since
z¯ = (z¯1, · · · , z¯l), where z¯h =
m∑
i=1
(xih − wih), it is
clear that
〈p¯, z¯〉 = 0. (4)
We assume that e is the vector in which every compo-
nent is 0, except the h-th, which is 1. Obviously e ∈ P .
Also, by Definition 9, 0 = 〈p¯, z¯〉 ≥ 〈e, z¯〉 = z¯h,
which means
z¯ ≦ 0. (5)
(4) and (5) together verify Condition (3). It has been
shown that any fuzzy equilibrium point of E˜ satisfies
Conditions (1)-(3), so it is a fuzzy competitive equilib-
rium of E˜ . The converse is obviously also true.
(ii) Unfortunately, Lemma 3 is not directly applica-
ble to E˜, because the action space is not compact. Let
X ′i = {xi | xi ∈ Xi, there exists xi′ ∈ Xi′
for each i′ 6= i such that z ≦ 0}.
X ′i is the set of consumption vectors available to agent
i if he completely controls the economy but has to take
the resource limitations into account. We plan to prove
that X ′i is bounded. Clearly, a fuzzy equilibrium point
x¯i of E˜ belongs toX
′
i .
Let xi ∈ X
′
i . Also by Assumption I, it yields that
0 ≦ xi ≦
m∑
i=1
wi −
∑
i′ 6=i
xi′ , xi′ ∈ Xi′ .
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Additionally, xi′ ≧ 0. It is true that
0 ≦ xi ≦
m∑
i=1
wi,
which meansX ′i is bounded for all i.
(iii) For any X ′i , we can select a positive real num-
ber c so that the cube C = {x | |xh| ≤ c for all h}
contains in the interior of any X ′i. Let X
′′
i = Xi ∩ C.
We propose a new abstract economy E˜′, identical to
E˜, except that Xi is replaced by X
′′
i everywhere. Let
A′i(x−i) be the resultant modification ofAi(x−i). It is
verified that all the conditions of Lemma 3 are satisfied
for E˜′.
FromAssumption I,Xi is a closed convex set andC
is a compact convex set. Therefore, X ′′i is a compact
convex set. P is evidently compact and convex.
For a consumption unit, the continuity and quasi-
concavity of u˜i(xi) are assured by Assumption II and
IV. For the market participant, the continuity is trivial
and the quasi-concavity holds for any linear function.
In addition, for the market participant, P is constant
and therefore trivially continuous. The closure of the
graph is simply the closure of H′′ = X ′′1 × · · · ×
X ′′m × P . Set P is certainly convex and non-empty.
Moreover, for a consumption unit, the set A′i(x−i) is
defined by a linear inequality in xi and hence is cer-
tainly convex. For any i, let x′i satisfy Assumption
V, i.e., x′i ≦ wi,x
′
i ∈ Xi. Since
m∑
i=1
(x′i − wi) ≦
0,x′i ∈ X
′
i for each i, it yields that x
′
i ∈ C. It
is shown that x′i ∈ Ai(x−i) for all x−i. On ac-
count that A′i(x−i) = Ai(x−i) ∩ C, A
′
i(x−i) con-
tains x′i and therefore is non-empty. Since the bud-
get restraint is a weak inequality between two contin-
uous functions of p, it is easily seen that the graph of
A′i(x−i) is closed. Furthermore, from the Remark in
Section 3.3.5 in Arrow and Debreu [14], if Assump-
tion V holds, then A′i(x−i) is continuous at the point
x−i = (x1, · · · ,xi−1,xi+1, · · · ,xm,p).
Consequently, the existence of a fuzzy equilibrium
point (x¯1, · · · , x¯m, p¯) for the fuzzy abstract economy
E˜′ has been demonstrated.
(iv) It needs to be shown that the fuzzy equilibrium
point (x¯1, · · · , x¯m, p¯) for the fuzzy abstract economy
E˜′ is also a fuzzy equilibrium point for the fuzzy ab-
stract economy E˜. The converse is obvious, so a fuzzy
competitive equilibrium is equivalent to a fuzzy equi-
librium point of E˜′.
From the definition of A′i(x−i), it is true that
〈p¯, x¯i〉 ≤ 〈p¯,wi〉. If we sum over i, then 〈p¯, x¯〉 ≤
〈p¯,w〉 or 〈p¯, z¯〉 ≤ 0. For a fixed z¯, p¯ is the optimal
value of the maximization problem 〈p, z¯〉 for p ∈ P .
By an argument similar to that used in the third para-
graph of (i), we find that formula (5) works. From (5)
and the definition of X ′i and C, x¯i ∈ X
′
i and x¯i is an
interior point of C for all i. It is assumed that for some
x′i ∈ Ai(x¯−i), u˜i(x
′
i) ≻ u˜i(x¯i). By Assumption IV,
u˜i[λx
′
i + (1 − λ)x¯i] ≻ u˜i(x¯i) if 0 < λ < 1.
However, for a sufficiently small λ, λx′i+(1−λ)x¯i ∈
C. By the convexity of Ai(x¯−i), it holds that λx
′
i +
(1−λ)x¯i ∈ Ai(x¯−i). Consequently,λx
′
i+(1−λ)x¯i ∈
A′i(x¯−i), which contradicts with the definition of x¯i as
an equilibrium value for E˜′. That means
x¯i is the optimum solution of max
xi∈Ai(x¯−i)
u˜i(xi).
Meanwhile, that p¯ maximizes 〈p, z¯〉 for p ∈ P is
directly implied by the definition of a fuzzy equilib-
rium point for E˜′, since the domain of p is the same in
both fuzzy abstract economies E˜ and E˜′.
Therefore, the point (x¯1, · · · , x¯m, p¯) is also a fuzzy
equilibrium point for E˜. Additionally, as shown in the
third paragraph of (i), it is a fuzzy competitive equilib-
rium of E˜ .
4.4. Variational approach
Note that, the goal of any agent becomes to find
his optimal consumption vector which maximizes his
fuzzy utility by accomplishing the exchange of the
goods in his budget set. This leads to the following op-
timization problem, for all i = 1, · · · ,m and p ∈ P :
u˜i(x¯i) ≈ max
xi∈Bi(p)
u˜i(xi), (6)
where Bi(p) = {xi | xi ∈ Xi, 〈p,xi〉 ≤ 〈p,wi〉}
is i’s budget set. We restrict p ∈ P = {p | p ∈
Rl,p ≧ 0,
∑l
h=1 ph = 1}, since for all λ > 0,
Bi(p) = Bi(λp).
From the total order relation of fuzzy numbers and
the expected utility function uiE(xi) of the fuzzy utility
function u˜i(xi), it yields that (6) is equivalent to saying
that
uiE(x¯i) = max
xi∈Bi(p)
uiE(xi). (7)
We assume for i = 1, · · · ,m:
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(i) uiE is continuous and strictly concave onXi;
(ii) For any xi ∈ Bi(p) : ∇u
i
E(xi) 6= 0, ∀p ∈ P
and ∀xi ∈ ∂Bi(p) :
∂uiE(xi)
∂xis
> 0, when xis = 0,
∀p ∈ P ;
(iii) lim
‖xi‖→+∞
xi∈Bi(p)
uiE(xi) = −∞; and
(iv) Any agent is endowed with a positive quantity of
at least one good, i.e., there exists a good h such
that wih > 0 for all i = 1, · · · ,m.
Under Assumptions (i)-(iv), for all i = 1, · · · ,m, the
maximization problem (7), i.e., (6), has a unique solu-
tion x¯i(p) for each p ∈ P , denoted by x¯i.
Therefore, the fuzzy competitive equilibrium of
Definition 6 is equivalent to the following statement:
Definition 10. For PXE-FP E˜ , let p¯ ∈ P and x¯ ∈
B(p¯) =
m∏
i=1
Bi(p¯). The pair (p¯, x¯) ∈ P × B(p¯) is a
fuzzy competitive equilibrium of E˜ if and only if
u˜i(x¯i) ≈ max
xi∈Bi(p¯)
u˜i(xi), for all i = 1, · · · ,m, (8)
and
zh =
m∑
i=1
(x¯ih − wih) ≤ 0, for any h = 1, · · · , l.
Analogous to (6), (8) is equivalent to saying that
uiE(x¯i) = max
xi∈Bi(p¯)
uiE(xi).
Consequently, from Theorem 1 in Anello et al. [6], it
is obvious that the pair (p¯, x¯) ∈ P × B(p¯) is a fuzzy
competitive equilibrium of a PXE-FP if and only if it is
a solution to the following quasi-variational inequality:
m∑
i=1
〈−∇uiE(x¯i), (xi − x¯i)〉−
〈
m∑
i=1
(x¯i −wi), (p− p¯)〉 ≥ 0, (9)
for any (p,x) ∈ P ×B(p¯).
Donato et al. [20] gave the existence theorem of so-
lutions to quasi-variational inequality problem (9) in
Theorem 4.
(p¯, x¯) ∈ P ×B(p¯) is a solution of (9) if and only if
for all i = 1, · · · ,m, x¯i(p) is a solution to
〈−∇uiE(x¯i), (xi−x¯i)〉 ≥ 0, for all xi ∈ Bi(p). (10)
and p¯ is the solution to
〈−
m∑
i=1
(x¯i−wi), (p− p¯)〉 ≥ 0, for all p ∈ P. (11)
Observe that, when the operator−∇uiE(x¯i) is strongly
monotone, variational inequality (10) has a unique so-
lution. If x¯i is a continuous function, then variational
inequality problem (11) admits a solution p¯ ∈ P , see-
ing that P is closed, convex and bounded.
Accordingly, we get the following theorem about
the existence of fuzzy equilibrium solutions immedi-
ately by an associated quasi-variational inequality.
Theorem 5. The pair (p¯, x¯) ∈ P × B(p¯) is a fuzzy
competitive equilibrium of a PXE-FP if and only if
(p¯, x¯) is a solution to the quasi-variational inequality
(9).
The following example will illustrate how to re-
search the fuzzy competitive equilibrium by a related
quasi-variational inequality.
Example 1. We consider a market consisting of two
different goods, denoted by good h = 1, 2, and two
agents, i.e., agent i = 1, 2. Each agent is endowed with
an initial vector wi = (wi1, wi2). The consumption
vector of any agent is xi = (xi1, xi2). It is assumed
that each commodity is sold and purchased at only one
price and the price vector is p = (p1, p2) satisfying
p1 + p2 = 1. Now we suppose that each agent has a
fuzzy utility function defined as follows:
u˜i(xi1, xi2) = −˜⌊0,
1
2
,
1
2
, 1⌋x2i1−˜⌊0,
1
3
,
2
3
, 1⌋x2i2
−˜⌊2bi1, bi1, bi1, 0⌋xi1−˜⌊2bi2,
3
2
bi2,
1
2
bi2, 0⌋xi2
±˜⌊2ci, ci, ci, 0⌋.
It is easy to work out that
uiE(xi1, xi2) = −
1
2
x2i1 −
1
2
x2i2 − bi1xi1− bi2xi2± ci.
For agent i = 1, 2, −∇uiE(xi) = (xi1 + bi1, xi2 +
bi2), we fix p ∈ P and find x¯i ∈ Bi(p) = {xi =
(xi1, xi2) | p1(xi1 − wi1) + p2(xi2 − wi2) ≤ 0} such
that for all xi ∈ Bi,
(x¯i1+bi1)(xi1−x¯i1)+(x¯i2+bi2)(xi2−x¯i2) ≥ 0. (12)
Notice that xij is the function of p. Since the operator
−∇uiE(xi) is strongly monotone, there exists a unique
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solution x¯i to the variational inequality. Assumption
(ii) is verified if we assume −bih > wih. Obviously,
the solution to (12) lies in the following set:
{xi ∈ R
2
+ : p1(xi1−wi1)+p2(xi2−wi2) = 0}. (13)
Moreover, search for the solution p¯ = (p¯1, p¯2) ∈ P
such that for all p = (p1, p2) ∈ P ,
− z1(p1 − p¯1) + (−z2)(p2 − p¯2) ≥ 0, (14)
where zh = (x¯1h−w1h)+(x¯2h−w2h) is the aggregate
excess demand function of any good h = 1, 2. Since
p1 + p2 = 1, from (14), it yields that
(z1 − z2)(p2 − p¯2) ≥ 0, for p2 ∈ [0, 1]. (15)
The solution of (15) is identical to the solution of the
following system:
{
z1 − z2 = 0,
p¯1 = 1− p¯2, p¯2 ≥ 0.
(16)
We discuss the solution to (12) and (15) by cases as
follows:
Case1. Assume that p1, p2 6= 0. For agent i = 1, 2,
by (13), it is true that
xi2 = wi2−
p1
p2
(xi1−wi1) and 0 ≤ xi1 ≤ wi1+wi2
p2
p1
.
Furthermore, from (12), it is easily seen that
[
p21 + p
2
2
p22
x¯i1 − (wi2 + bi2)
p1
p2
− wi1(
p1
p2
)2 + bi1
]
(xi1 − x¯i1) ≥ 0.
Accordingly, solving (12) is equivalent to solving the
system as follows:
{
p21+p
2
2
p22
x¯i1 − (wi2 + bi2)
p1
p2
− wi1(
p1
p2
)2 + bi1 = 0,
0 ≤ x¯i1 ≤ wi1 +wi2
p2
p1
, x¯i2 = wi2 −
p1
p2
(xi1 −wi1).
(17)
The solution to (17) is


x¯i1 =
p22
p21+p
2
2
[
wi1(
p1
p2
)2 + (wi2 + bi2)
p1
p2
− bi1
]
,
x¯i2 =
p21
p21+p
2
2
[
wi2(
p2
p1
)2 + (wi1 + bi1)
p2
p1
− bi2
]
,
(18)
under the condition that for (p1, p2) ∈ P ,
{
wi1(
p1
p2
)2 + (wi2 + bi2)
p1
p2
− bi1 ≥ 0,
wi2(
p2
p1
)
2
+ (wi1 + bi1)
p2
p1
− bi2 ≥ 0.
(19)
Subcase1. If condition (19) holds for any agent i =
1, 2, then the solution to the variational inequality (12)
is (18). Combining formulas (16) and (18), it is clearly
known that{
Bp21+(B−A)p1p2−Ap
2
2
p21+p
2
2
= 0,
p2 = 1− p1.
(20)
Consequently, the solution to (20), i.e., (15) is


p1 =
A
A+B ,
p2 =
B
A+B ,
where A = w11 + b11 + w21 + b21, B = w12 + b12 +
w22 + b22.
Subcase2. If system (17) does not have any solu-
tion, then we find the solution to (12) on the boundary
of the set {xi ∈ R
2
+ : p1(xi1−wi1)+p2(xi2−wi2) =
0}, which is either x¯i1 = 0 or x¯i2 = 0. The pair
{
x¯i1 = 0,
x¯i2 = wi2 + wi1
p1
p2
,
(21)
is the solution to variational inequality (12) if and only
if
wi1(
p1
p2
)2 + (wi2 + bi2)
p1
p2
− bi1 < 0, (22)
for (p1, p2) ∈ P .
If (22) does not hold, it is true that
{
x¯i1 = wi1 + wi2
p2
p1
,
x¯i2 = 0,
(23)
is the solution to variational inequality (12) if and only
if
wi2(
p2
p1
)2 + (wi1 + bi1)
p2
p1
− bi2 < 0, (24)
for (p1, p2) ∈ P .
Note that solution (21) or (23) in this case is contin-
uous in P .
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If condition (22) holds, for any agent i = 1, 2, the
solution to (17) is (21). Under this situation, solving
(15) is equivalent to solving the system
{
1 + p1
p2
= 0,
p1 = 1− p2 ≥ 0, p2 > 0.
(25)
It is found that (25) has no solution, which shows the
solution to (15) in the boundary of P , i.e., p¯ = (0, 1).
If (24) holds for every agent i = 1, 2, the solution
to (17) is (23). Under this circumstance, the solution of
(15) is the same as the solution to the following system
{
1 + p2
p1
= 0,
p1 = 1− p2 > 0, p2 ≥ 0.
(26)
It is true that (26) has no solution, which implies that
the solution to (15) lies in the boundary of P , i.e., p¯ =
(1, 0).
Case2. Given that p1 = 0 and p2 = 1, the
budget set of agent i = 1, 2 is Bi(0, 1) = {xi ∈
R2+ | xi2 ≤ wi2}. Hence, the solution to (12) is
(x¯i1(0, 1), x¯i2(0, 1)) = (−bi1, wi2). Moreover, p =
(0, 1) is the solution to (15) if and only if z1− z2 < 0.
But from (x¯i1(0, 1), x¯i2(0, 1)) = (−bi1, wi2), we get
that z1−z2 = −b11−w11−b21−w21 > 0, which con-
tradicts with z1 − z2 < 0. In other words, p = (0, 1)
is not the solution to (15).
Case3. Provided that p1 = 1 and p2 = 0, the bud-
get set of agent i = 1, 2 is Bi(1, 0) = {xi ∈ R
2
+ |
xi1 ≤ wi1}. As a consequence, the solution to (12)
is (x¯i1(1, 0), x¯i2(1, 0)) = (wi1,−bi2). Furthermore,
p = (1, 0) is the solution to (15) if and only if z1 −
z2 > 0. Nevertheless, from (x¯i1(1, 0), x¯i2(1, 0)) =
(wi1,−bi2), we obtain that z1−z2 = b12+w12+b22+
w22 < 0, which contradicts with z1 − z2 > 0. That is,
p = (1, 0) is not the solution to (15).
In a word, p1 =
A
A+B , p2 =
B
A+B is the unique so-
lution to (15). As a result, the fuzzy competitive equi-
librium of the PXE-FP is (p¯, x¯), where
p¯ = (
A
A+B
,
B
A+B
),
x¯ =


w11A
2+(w12+b12)AB−b11B
2
A2+B2
w12B
2+(w11+b11)AB−b12A
2
A2+B2
w21A
2+(w22+b22)AB−b21B
2
A2+B2
w22B
2+(w21+b21)AB−b22A
2
A2+B2

 .
We explain the solution of the quasi-variational in-
equality from the point of economics as follows:
(i) The supply of good h = 1, 2 equals to the de-
mand following from
x¯11 + x¯21 =
(w11 + w21)A
2 + AB2 − (b21 + b11)B
2
A2 +B2
=
(w11 + w21)A
2 + (w11 + w21)B
2
A2 +B2
= w11 + w21.
In the same way, it holds that x¯12+ x¯22 = w12+
w22.
(ii) At the equilibrium price, both agents can af-
ford their allocation for their given initial endow-
ments, i.e.,
p¯1(x¯11 − w11) + p¯2(x¯12 − w12) =
A
A +B
[
w11A
2 + (w12 + b12)AB − b11B
2
A2 +B2
− w11
]
+
B
A + B
[
w12B
2 + (w11 + b11)AB − b12A
2
A2 +B2
− w12
]
=
A
A +B
[
(w12 + b12)AB − (b11 + w11)B
2
A2 + B2
]
+
B
A + B
[
(w11 + b11)AB − (b12 + w12)A
2
A2 + B2
]
= 0.
Analogously, p¯1(x¯21−w21)+p¯2(x¯22−w22) = 0.
(iii) Agent i = 1, 2 fuzzily weakly prefers the con-
sumption bundle (x¯i1, x¯i2) to the initial endow-
ment vector (wi1, wi2). That is,
E(u˜1(x¯11, x¯12)) − E(u˜1(w11, w12)) =
w211(A
2 + B2)2 − [w11A
2 + (w12 + b12)AB − b11B
2]2
2(A2 +B2)2
−
w212(A
2 + B2)2[w12B
2 + (w11 + b11)AB − b12A
2]2
2(A2 + B2)2
−
b11[w11A
2 + (w12 + b12)AB − b11B
2]
A2 +B2
−
b12[w12B
2 + (w11 + b11)AB − b12A
2]
A2 +B2
+ b11w
2
11 + b12w
2
12
=
[(w11 + b11)B − (w12 + b12)A]
2
2(A2 + B2)
≥ 0.
Hence, it is true that u˜1(x¯11, x¯12) < u˜1(w11, w12).
Moreover, if the equality holds, (w11 + b11)B =
(w12 + b12)A. At this time, x¯1h = w1h, h = 1, 2,
which means the initial endowment vector for agent 1
is optimal. Similarly, we can get that u˜2(x¯21, x¯22) <
u˜2(w21, w22). It is figured out that two goods are dis-
tributed efficiently between two agents after an ex-
change of goods.
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we established a fuzzy binary rela-
tion to evaluate the fuzzy preference or indifference of
alternative consumption vectors and proved that there
exists a continuous fuzzy order-preserving function on
the consumption set under some assumptions. Further-
more, the existence result of fuzzy competitive equi-
librium for the PXE-FP was provided through two dif-
ferent methods. Therefore, when any agent’s attitude is
vague, we can find out the redistribution of the agents
and the price vector of the goods in view of the model
of pure exchange economy with fuzzy preference pro-
posed in our paper.
We only proved the existence of the competitive
equilibrium for the PXE-FP under some assumptions
in this paper. Future research on the PXE-FP will be
done on, for example, the uniqueness and the stability
of the fuzzy competitive equilibrium. The latter study
would require the specification of the dynamics of a
competitivemarket with fuzzy preferences. Finally, the
existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium could
be verified by applying the generalized linear discrete-
time system with fuzzy dynamic PXE-FP. A concrete
dynamic PXE-FP simulation model could also be pro-
vided to confirm the results.
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